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Abstract 
The integration of renewable resources on a large scale for power generation has become an 
emerging topic for sustainability and the most viable alternative for the present power generation 
sources (thermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.). With the integration of DER into the existing smart grid 
network, new challenges will surface. Since the smart grid is a cyber-physical system, the threat 
of cyber-based attacks focusing on the power sector is growing in number and its sophistication. 
As in the past, there have been attacks on power grids resulting in infrastructure damage (Stuxnet) 
or blackouts (Ukrainian attack), DER systems can also be impacted by cyber-attacks. DER 
involves the use of various protocols like IEEE 2030.5, DNP3, Modbus and IEC 61850 for 
communication of control and measurement signals.  IDS already exists for Scada environment 
and industrial control systems, but there has not been a lot of work done in this field when it comes 
to DER integrated power grid.   
In this work, we make the following contributions: (i) propose a Distributed Intrusion Detection 
System (D-IDS) architecture, (ii) develop Modbus protocol attack scripts, (iii) develop IDS rules 
for Modbus DER protocol relating to function codes, measurement data (iv) implement the IDS 
architecture and rules in a testbed environment, and (v) conduct experimentation evaluations for 
evaluating the detection accuracy of IDS and latency performance of the network. Our studies 
show that the IDS gets high accuracy results for detecting different attacks be it IT or Modbus 
protocol specific attacks, and the network latency, with IDS enabled, does not have any negative 
impacts on DER monitoring applications.  
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Chapter 1: Distributed Energy Resources (DER) 
1.1 DER - Introduction  
 
There has always been a need for a secure and reliable grid. Distributed energy resources 
and micro grids are two different ways to guarantee continuous power, paying little heed to the 
climate or any unanticipated occasion. DER includes solar PVs, batteries, electric vehicles etc. and 
are connected to lower voltage distribution grids like residences and small businesses unlike 
traditional generating units which are connected to high voltage transmission grids. DER have 
become an important aspect of power generation in recent times and with the focus on integrating 
distributed energy resources in the power grid, the penetration of renewable resources technology 
in the grid environment has been soaring at a high rate. In 2018 alone, solar power contributed 
66.6 terawatt-hours in the US [3], one-third of which was produced by small scale solar 
installations. States like California, Hawaii and New York are using solar generation to fulfill 
energy demand to a great extent. The total solar power generation in California as of 2018 was 
32533 GWh and they aim at achieving 50% renewable energy by 2030. The integration of DER 
has fundamentally changed how an electric grid works, consuming power right where it is 
generated. Homes and businesses with DER installations are consumers as well as are part time 
producers who can all be connected with other DER instalments to optimize its use and give back 
excess generation back to the grid or other users. 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1.2 Features of DER  
 
DER units can be geographically dispersed in nature; the DER data traffic is generally 
aggregated through an aggregator which is responsible for communicating control and 
measurement signals between a utility and prosumers. These infrastructures are carefully 
intertwined with a physical and a cyber-layer which ensures reliability and security of the grid.  
The information flows between all the players involved in power generation be it 
households, businesses, power plants, aggregators or utilities and they it is very critical for robust, 
reliable, and resilient functioning of a grid. This flow consists of critical control and measurement 
signals, metering, load, billing information, and other aspects related to power generation, making 
it a blend of physical and cyber elements. The cyber infrastructure is a supportive component in 
the power grid responsible for end to end transmission of power related information; remotely 
monitoring and operating assets which also makes it a critical part of the system as a whole for 
proper functioning. The addition of this component to the existing traditional grid has made the 
grid a little more susceptible to malicious actions. Adversaries have more possible attack paths to 
exploit to cause hindrance in grid operational activities. The cyber element was developed and 
implemented in the grid for the need of informational flow and increasing the observability for 
remote operators with no priority given to security measures. In recent times, groups with 
malicious intent have exploited this shortcoming to carry out attacks which have caused power 
outage and dysfunctioning of the grid. Few examples of such cases are the 2015 Ukrainian Attack 
[3] where the adversary gained total access to the control center of three energy distributional 
companies while disabling all functions at the utility end to trip relays causing power outage. Then 
in 2009, we saw the use of Stuxnet worm [2] by malicious actors on an Iranian nuclear facility, 
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causing an operational decline in uranium enrichment centrifuges. With such exploitations in the 
last two decades, authorities all over the world are focusing on the security aspect of the cyber-
physical infrastructure in the grid to make the system more resilient to such attacks.  
Security of the infrastructure has been an emphasis in the development and implementation 
of DER infrastructure. New protocols with robust security and enriching the old protocols with 
state-of-the-art security measures have been proposed and are being implemented by utilities and 
manufacturers in real world deployments. We have communication protocols like IEEE 2030.5 
and DNP3 as the application layer protocol stacked over TCP/IP for communication between end 
devices like PV inverters/distributed energy resources clients and the aggregators/utility relaying 
the information about measurement values, metering, pricing, types of end devices connected and 
different types of communication servers. There is Zigbee, Ethernet or wireless internet for 
communication between devices at the lowest level and on the other hand, we have Modbus that 
is used for power measurements communication. Any foul play with these information packets 
can have serious impacts ranging from end devices being tripped to an abnormality in frequency 
or power generation. Protocols like IEEE 2030.5 which come with inbuilt TLS 1.2 support with 
128-bit AES encryption have been proposed as the de-facto protocol in the California Rule 21 [4] 
regulation for DER communication. Also, due the presence of many vendors and already existing 
legacy DER devices, older protocols are being upgraded and equipped with bump-in-the-wire 
security functionality for more robustness and resilience, such protocols include DNP3 and 
Modbus. The aim of this research work is on the cyber aspect of this cyber-physical infrastructure 
focusing on Modbus protocol from a DER point of view.  
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1.2 Related work 
 
Papers and reports pertaining to security in the DER network have been on the rise since 
DER implementation is gaining pace. The paper ‘Cybersecurity for Distributed Energy Resources 
and Smart Inverters’ [5] proposes a typical DER CPS architecture and talks about the 
vulnerabilities and proposed mitigation techniques that are seen in the infrastructure at various 
levels, be it device, network or utility. They have not focused on the protocols in specific but have 
provided a general idea about the problem at hand.  
Reports provided by Sandia National labs [6][7] talk about the recommended cybersecurity 
guidelines and standards, protocol security and DER security aspect in a very detailed view. 
Protocols at all levels have been explored. The paper elaborates the information model for DER 
protocols, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEEE 2030.5 and DNP3, the security capability, the shortcomings 
in the security of each protocol and the recommendations made for the mentioned protocols. The 
reports were very beneficial in touching base with what problems and features exist in the protocols 
but didn’t give a very detailed picture of the protocol itself. 
Documents provided by Modbus.org [8][9] for specification and implementation of 
Modbus protocol, and Security Onion [10] for IDS implementation and deployment have been 
used as reference for developing attack scripts and rulesets respectively. 
Related work in the field of intrusion detection system for Modbus protocol has been 
carried out but it has been done from an industrial control system [11] point of view, which uses 
standalone Snort IDS to monitor Modbus protocol. We aim to study the protocol from a DER 
perspective and deploy a distributed intrusion detection system for DER Modbus applications.  
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Chapter 2: DER Architecture 
The figure below shows a typical cyber-physical system control loop architecture for DER 
application with various DER protocols that are responsible for communicating real time state and 
performance information between different network levels of the system.  
 
Figure 1. Typical DER Architecture 
 
We have Energy Management Systems (EMS), Distribution Management System (DMS) 
and Distribution Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS) situated at the utility control 
center to receive measurements and send control signals over the DER wide area network, which 
encompasses a number of aggregator units responsible to transmit and receive signals to and from 
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the distributed network of DER devices like PV plants, individual PVs and electric vehicles. These 
DER devices comprise an end device and a DER Client. 
Since the devices are geographically distributed over a wide area, the communication 
network plays a very important role in the efficient operation of the DER power grid. Because of 
this criticality, it becomes more of a concern to safeguard these communication networks 
throughout, in order to secure the grid from individuals or groups with malicious intent.  
The protocols differ from each other within different levels of operation: 
● DER device to DER client - Modbus 
● DER client to aggregator - IEEE 2030.5/ DNP3 
● aggregator to DERMS - IEEE 2030.5/ DNP3 
As recommended by California rule-21 [4] and Common Smart Inverter Profile, the de-facto 
communication protocol between end device and DER Client is made to be Modbus whose 
information model is mapped to Sunspec Modbus, and the protocol between DER client all the 
way to the utility control system is recommended to be DNP3 whose information model is mapped 
to DNP3 Application Note 2018 or IEEE 2030.5 whose information model is mapped to CSIP.  
In this research work, we focus on the security of the Field Device level communication 
protocol i.e. Modbus. 
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Chapter 3: DER Protocol and Security 
For DER, all communications are recommended to be sent over TCP/IP, which allows it 
to be encrypted using TLS and IPsec, authenticating the packets at the network layer. The Modbus 
protocol used at the first level of communication between end device and DER client, was not built 
with keeping security in perspective. If you can ping a Modbus device, you own it. Serial 
communication happening over RS232 is not recommended as TCP/IP Modbus messages can be 
encrypted using TLS, and RS232 communication needs BITW encryption technologies which can 
be expensive . 
DNP3 1815-2012 (DNP3 SA) describes an application layer security support that addresses 
the threat of spoofing and adheres to the IEC 62351 security standard. Though the protocol doesn’t 
require TLS, it supports the functionality. It is however recommended to utilize TLS includes 
newer and robust cipher suites for more secure communication. Threats addressed in the protocol 
are spoofing, modification, replay and eavesdropping [6].  
In IEEE 2030.5, there are no existing physical security parameters. The certificates used 
have no expiration or methods of revocation. If the certificates are compromised at any level, the 
server or client cannot revoke the device certificates. Due to the use of encrypted traffic in IEEE 
2030.5, which is implemented using TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 cipher 
suite, there exist constraints to monitor traffic before it reaches system endpoints. Attackers can 
send malicious encrypted packets and compromise the network at a large scale. Also, there are no 
approaches proposed to update cryptographic algorithms for DERs as a whole during their 
lifetime[7]. 
 9 
3.1 Modbus  
Modbus was developed by MODICON in 1979 as a serial communication protocol, which 
is now open source. Modbus has three variations, Modbus ASCII, Modbus RTU [8] and Modbus 
TCP/IP [9]. This research work focuses on Modbus TCP/IP which uses ethernet cables and 
switches for communication in a client-server fashion. Modbus TCP/IP is divided into five layers 
namely Modbus Application Layer, Modbus on TCP, TCP, IP and Ethernet Physical Layer in that 
order. Modbus TCP/IP is chosen over Modbus RTU as it is simple to implement. It  provides the 
capability to talk to more than one slave, has high interoperability, uses standard ethernet cards 
eliminating the need for special serial communication chipsets and doesn’t limit the use to a few 
vendors. 
 
Figure 2. Modbus Protocol Stack  
  
The difference which sets it apart from other variations is the addition of a Modbus 
Application Header (MBAP) at the start of each Modbus message. The slave ID and the CRC 
fields are removed from the Modbus message used in Modbus RTU and MBAP header is added 
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instead, containing all the data required to route the packet to the corresponding device. The default 
port is set to be 502. Figure 3[8][9] gives a picture of how the two Modbus variations differ. 
 
Modbus RTU Frame 
 
Modbus TCP/IP Frame 
Figure 3.. Different Modbus Frames 
 
The size of the frames is as following: 
Modbus RTU Frame = 253 bytes (PDU) + 1 byte (Address) + 2 bytes (CRC) = 256 bytes 
Modbus TCP/IP Frame = 253 bytes (PDU) + 7 bytes (MBAP) = 260 bytes 
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The MBAP[9] includes the following fields: 
Transaction Identifier Protocol 
Identifier 
Length Unit Identifier 
Identifier for 
Request/Response transaction 
Modbus 
Protocol = 0 
Number of 
following bytes 
Identifier for remote 
Slave connected 
2 Bytes 2 Bytes 2 Bytes 1 Byte 
  
The protocol consists of four data tables, two of them storing discrete values (1 bit data) 
called coils and two storing 16 bit (int) numerical data values called registers. There is one read 
only table and one read/write table. Each of these data tables have a maximum of 9999 addresses. 
Table 1 - Data Table and Addresses[8] 
Data Table Addresses 
Coils - read/write 00001-09999 
Discrete Inputs - read only 10001-19999 
Input Registers - read only 30001-39999 
Holding Registers - read/write 40001-49999 
  
 
 
 
 12 
Table 2 - Function Codes[8]  
(Highlighted rows are Most Commonly Used Function Codes) 
Code Function 
1 Read Coils 
2 Read Discrete Input 
3 Read Holding Registers 
4 Read Input Register 
5 Write Single Coil 
6 Write Single Holding Register 
15 Write Multiple Coils 
16 Write Multiple Registers 
20 Read File Record 
21 Write File Record 
22 Mast Write Register 
23 Read/Write Multiple Registers 
24 Read FIFO Queue 
43 Read Device Identification 
43 Encapsulated Interface Transport 
43 CANopen General Reference 
  
 13 
 Using the mentioned-above function codes, we can utilize the various Modbus 
functionalities. The server generates a normal response when it receives a request without any 
errors, and it can handle the query sent by the client in a normal way. If an error occurs without 
any communication error but cannot be handled, an error exception code is generated in the 
response by the server which is denoted by the function code + 0x80. There are seven exception 
codes: 
Table 3. Exception Codes[8] 
Code Function Use 
1 Illegal Function Function not recognized by slave or not allowed by 
slave 
2 Illegal Data Address Data address in query is not allowed for the slave 
3 Illegal Data Value Data field value in query is not acceptable 
4 Server Device Failure Unrecoverable error when server makes an attempt to 
perform a request 
6 Server Device Busy Device is engaged in a process 
10 Gateway Path Unavailable Gateway is misconfigured 
11 Gateway Target Device Failed to 
Respond 
No response received from device 
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The Modbus TCP/IP normal response and exception response is shown below in figure 4 and 
figure 5 respectively: 
 
Figure 4. Normal Operational Response 
 
The Client initiates a response (query) to request some data using a specified function and 
the data register address or data register address and value, for example write coil (x05) and write 
register 60 (x3C) with value 70 (x46). The Server performs the action and sends the response to 
the corresponding response with information about the action. 
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 Figure 5. Exception Operation Response 
 
Here the Client initiates a response (query) to write coil (x05) and write an invalid register 
70 (x46) which does not exist with value 74 (x4A). The Server tries to perform the action but is 
unsuccessful, so in turn it sends out the response with corresponding exception code (x85\x02) 
informing the Client that a function was being performed on an illegal data address. 
 3.2 Security in Modbus Protocol 
Modbus is a clear text protocol that was developed without any inbuilt security measures 
for real-time monitoring and control purposes. Bump-in-the-wire techniques are used to make the 
protocol secure in communication networks. As of October 2018, Modbus did not have any over-
the-wire security measures and lacked encryption, key management and authentication [7]. The 
connection between the server and client is completed with a TCP handshake and the client 
responds to queries made by any server who makes a request. This creates a gap in the security of 
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the device and infrastructure, and can be exploited by an adversary with malicious intent. Since 
the recommendations made for DER security does not count for any physical security, devices are 
open to physical intrusions and eavesdropping attacks. In the past, research papers have talked 
about hardware level attacks like physical tampering i.e. adding or removal of connections to 
bypass any critical security functionality present or firmware-based attacks targeted towards 
Modbus gateway or the device itself [5]. Through this research work, we set up attacks and 
defenses from an information technology and protocol functionality perspective for the DER 
testbed in Iowa State University’s PowerCyber Laboratory. We make use of open source pen-
testing tools, self-created python scripts for attack modules and security information and event 
management tools for defenses in order to test and implement security on the DER testbed for 
Modbus protocol. 
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Chapter 4: Intrusion Detection System for DER Environment 
  
4.1 Intrusion Detection System 
Intrusion detection systems are used to provide observability for a network and is one of 
the best tools in practice for monitoring and controlling a network of systems. Since the tool only 
provides detection capabilities, there is always a need for an Intrusion Prevention System which 
in our case is a PfSense firewall put in line with the DER Plant Controller and IDS sensor.  
An IDS environment setup [10] contains various nodes for operation. These are master 
node, sensor node, forward node, storage node and heavy node. IDS deployment can be of two 
types: Standalone or Distributed deployment. In a Standalone architecture, the IDS sensor carries 
out all the functions of a master node, forward node and a storage node. A Distributed IDS 
deployment is where a master node is securely connected to various nodes i.e. sensor, forward, 
storage or heavy, carrying out individual or multi operations for monitoring operation. 
The master node is like the brain of an IDS network where rules for detection are updated 
and forwarded to sensor nodes. We monitor the alerts, at the master node through a dashboard, 
generated by the sensor node through promiscuous sniffing using those rules that we have designed 
characterizing what we call as abnormal or malicious activity.  
A sensor node has a management interface which connects it to the master node using a 
secure shell (SSH) and can have one, two or more sniffing interfaces. It can be a forward node 
whose job is to capture network traffic, inspect the packets against the rules deployed and alert the 
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master upon coming across any matches to the rules or it can be of a storage node where all logs 
are stored.  
To make the DER cyber-physical system more observable from a security point of view, 
we have proposed a distributed intrusion detection system which is shown in Figure 6. Intrusion 
detection systems are placed at three levels for detection, the field devices level, the MUD gateway 
level and at the control center level. All these IDSs are in turn connected to a IDS Master installed 
at the Control Center for overall monitoring purposes. Each IDS at its level, monitors the related 
protocol at that level i.e.  Field Devices IDS monitors Modbus, Control Center IDS monitors 
DNP3/IEEE 2030.5 and MUD Gateway IDS monitors IT protocols. 
 
Figure 6.  Simplified DER Architecture with Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
For our testbed, we have deployed a distributed IDS, the table below encapsulates for which 
attack types we have used the IDS and what type of other defensive mechanism we have put up 
to make the network more robust against attackers.  
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Table 4. Attack Category and IDS Rule Base 
Category Protocol 
Protocol 
attribute Attack description Attack type Rule number 
Reconnaissance ICMP  
Ping on Modbus Slave and DER 
Plant controller Not Stealthy Rule 1 
 TCP  
Scan on IPs, Ports and System 
Details Not Stealthy Rule 2 
DOS/DDOS TCP SYN Flag IP Spoofing SYN Packet Flooding Stealthy Rule 3 
 TCP 
TCP connect 
flood IP Spoofing Packet Flooding Stealthy  
 TCP/ICMP  Non-Modbus Traffic 
Stealthy/Not 
Stealthy Rule 4 
 Modbus 
Illegal Address 
Operation on 
Write Function Write request on Modbus Coil Not Stealthy Rule 5 
 Modbus 
Illegal Address 
Operation on 
Write Function Write request on Modbus Register Not Stealthy Rule 6 
Spoofing ARP  ARP Spoofing to stop write request Not Stealthy  
File Operation TCP  Remote Shell on System Not Stealthy  
Modbus 
Function Code Modbus Read Coil Not Stealthy Rule 7 
 Modbus Read Holding Register Not Stealthy Rule 7 
 Modbus Read Discrete Input Not Stealthy Rule 7 
 Modbus Read Input Register Not Stealthy Rule 7 
 Modbus Write Coil Not Stealthy Rule 8 
 Modbus Write Holding Register Not Stealthy Rule 8 
 Modbus Write/Read 
Holding Register check 
measurement data Not Stealthy Rule 9 
 
Table 4. incorporates the various attacks and corresponding attributes for them, and also 
the type of defense we have for each of them implemented in the testbed. Rules have been 
discussed in detail later in the document. We follow the basic steps of attack propagation that is 
carried out in any cyber-attack starting from reconnaissance, scanning, and leading to exploiting 
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the vulnerabilities involving IT and OT traffic based on the OS, open ports and functionality of 
the protocol. 
4.2 Rule Generation 
 
The1 D-IDS is deployed using the SIEM tool Security Onion whose snort engine was used 
to implement rule-based IDS in the DER environment. Since in an industrial control environment, 
the network mainly consists of static traffic that allows us to write more robust rules. Robust in the 
sense that any critical function traffic that is not being generated by an authorized system should 
be treated as an abnormal traffic in the network. IT rules deployed in the system are protocol 
specific or time threshold based, and Modbus rules are application layer based looking into the 
function codes, exception codes, 1-bit and 16-bit data.  
A basic snort rule format is given below: 
action protocol source address & port direction destination address & port (msg“”; sid;) 
 Table 5. Ruleset 
Rule 
No. 
Snort Rule 
1. 
alert icmp any any -> PVinverter any (msg: “ping on DER end device”; sid:9600001;) 
2. 
alert tcp !DERPlantController any -> PVinverter  any (msg: "TCP SYN Flood on 
Modbus End Device"; flags:S; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 500, seconds 
5; sid: 9650032;) 
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3. 
alert tcp !DERPlantController any -> PVinverter  !$TCP_PORTS  (msg: "NMAP scan 
on DER End Device"; flags:S; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 500, seconds 
30; sid:9650034;) 
4. 
alert tcp !DERPlantController any -> PVinverter  502 (msg: "Non Modbus 
Communication on port 502"; flow:from_client,established;  content: "!|00 00|"; offset: 
2; classtype:misc-attack; sid:120000005; rev:1;) 
5. 
alert tcp PVinverter  any -> any any (msg: "DOS attack on Modbus PLC - Illegal Data 
Address for Coil"; flow:to_client,established; content:"|00 00|"; offset:2; depth:2; 
content:"|85 02|"; distance:3; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:120000006; rev:1;) 
6. 
alert tcp PVinverter any -> any any (msg: "DOS attack on Modbus PLC - Illegal Data 
Address for Register"; flow:to_client,established; content:"|00 00|"; offset:2; depth:2; 
content:"|86 02|"; distance:3; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:120000007; rev:1;) 
7. 
alert tcp !DERPlantController any -> PVinverter  502 (msg: "Modbus - Unauthorized 
Read Request to PVinverter"; flow:from_client,established; content:"|00 00|"; offset:2; 
depth:2; pcre:"/[\S\s]{3}(\x01|\x02|\x03|\x04|\x11|\x14|\x17|\x18|\x2B)/i"; 
classtype:misc-attack; sid:120000003; rev:1;) 
8. 
alert tcp !DERPlantController any -> PVinverter  502 (msg: "Modbus - Unauthorized 
Write Request to PVinverter"; flow:from_client,established; content:"|00 00|"; offset:2; 
depth:2; pcre:"/[\S\s]{3}(\x05|\x06|\x0F|\x10|\x15|\x16)/i"; classtype:misc-attack; 
sid:120000004; rev:1;) 
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9. 
alert tcp  any any -> PVinverter  any (msg: "Modbus Holding Register below 100 for 
Register 50"; content: "|00 00|"; offset: 2; depth: 2; content: "|06|"; distance: 3; 
content: "|00 32|"; distance: 0; byte_test: 2,<,0x0064,0,relative; sid: 120000008;) 
 
Protocol Specific (Rule 1) 
Ping rules are protocol specific meaning the snort engine looks for only ICMP packets sent to the 
target system (eg. PVinverter) where we want to detect the alerts.  
Time Threshold Rules (Rule 2-3) 
Rules for reconnaissance and denial-of-service attacks are implemented as time threshold rules. 
The fundamental behind this rule is to monitor packets for a certain time period and generate an 
alert if the specific event reaches the specified time threshold.  
The threshold of the packets can be changed according to how sensitive we want the detection to 
be. Example, for the TCP SYN flooding rule, we have used the threshold of 500 assuming that a 
traffic of that kind within 5 seconds would hinder our network performance and such problem 
needs to be mitigated.   
We see in the above rule, the mention of type both and track by_src whose functions are to generate 
an alert once every 5 or 30 seconds after seeing 500 SYN packets defined in the field flags as per 
the two rules, ignoring any other additional packets in the 5 or 30 seconds interval and track the 
incoming packets by their source address.  
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Modbus Application Layer Rules (Rule 4-9) 
As mentioned earlier in the document, the Modbus Application Layer contains information such 
as the protocol id, data, coil or register address and function code. These attributes were leveraged 
in developing the rules for malicious packet detection.  
The rule 4 specifically looks for packets that don’t correspond to value |00 00| in the application 
layer in the third- and fourth-byte position i.e. the protocol id for Modbus on the port 502. 
The rules 5 and 6 look for the exception codes |85 02| and |86 02| that are reserved for the illegal 
function (85, 86) and illegal data address (02) for coil and register respectively.  
Rules 7 and 8 mentioned in the table have been leveraged from the Digitalbond repository [12] 
and tuned to our needs. The rules are used to identify all the read (rule 7) and write (rule 8) 
functionality of Modbus communication coming to PV inverter from any other source than the 
DER Plant Controller. The read and write functions are relating to all data register types and 
relating functionality.  
Rule 9 is an example of a measurement data rule which looks for the specific register address 
(0x0032) and register value (0x0064) and generates an alert if the register value is set lower than 
the value specified in the rule. 
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Chapter 5: Experimental Evaluation 
5.1 Testbed 
 
The environment for the experimentation and analysis is set up using an industry grade 
OPAL-RT simulator which provides us with models for DER that includes PV inverter modules 
for generating measurement data serving as the DER end devices. We have made use of a linux 
box running a python script using the PyModbus library to poll readings for coils and registers and 
write data into the coils and holding register treating them as the DER Plant Controller.  
 
 
Figure 7. DER Testbed 
In our testbed environment, we have incorporated the Distributed Intrusion Detection 
System deployment. Our IDS sensor which entails both the functionality of a forward and storage 
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node sits parallel to the DER Plant Controller and sniffs network traffic on two interfaces, one 
connecting the DER Plant Controller and the other connecting the PV inverter. Both network 
interfaces are independent of each other and communicate through the WAN router. The sensor is 
further connected to an IDS master. We have made use of Security Onion as the Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool, which leverages various other tools like Sguil, 
Snort, Kibana, Pulled Pork, etc. to perform the various operations. Sguil is used as a dashboard to 
view alerts on an IDS master sent through Snort. Pulled Pork is used to deploy rules stored at the 
master to the sensor nodes, etc.  
5.2 Attack Scenarios 
All functionalities of the Modbus protocol were exploited either by using the Modbus 
pentesting tool[13] or by the python attack scripts that we created. The tool has capabilities to 
create denial-of-service attacks by leveraging the Modbus write function for coil and registers by 
sending illegal data address packets in bursts. It also has read, write and slave identification 
capabilities but limits the attacks to one slave at a time. The python scripts were developed to carry 
out read and write operation for coils and registers with keeping scalability of attack in mind i.e. 
these scripts can be easily used towards injecting packets to a number of slaves at a given moment 
of time. An example of such attack script for coil read query is given in figure 8, the script is 
written in python and it sends out ten read queries for coil 50 (x3C). 
 26 
 
Figure 8. Modbus Attack Script for Read Coil Function 
Attacks ranging from reconnaissance, scanning, DOS, DDOS and Modbus related attacks 
were performed to test the robustness of our intrusion detection system. All the attacks were carried 
out by a KALI machine connected to the WAN interface. 
 
 
5.3 Latency Analysis of Network 
As a network grows in size, the complexity of the communication network also increases. 
Number of hops a packet has to make before reaching its destination can be a critical element in 
finding a rogue user in the network. If we know the round trip time of the systems in our network, 
it can be used as valuable information to predict if an attacker many hops away is trying to inject 
packets to the systems present in the environment. Network analysis was done on the DER testbed 
limiting the scope to the DER Plant Controller and the PV inverter for various attributes like system 
latency of critical Modbus functions.   
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Round trip time of the read and write function under no attack condition was determined 
by calculating the response time for each function query made by the DER Plant Controller to the 
PV inverter using Wireshark logs. 
 
Figure 9. Round Trip Time for various Modbus functions in the Testbed 
To analyze the network behavior under a DOS attack, a TCP SYN flood attack was carried 
from the KALI machine connected to the WAN interface on port 6002. 898088 packets were 
injected in 26 seconds during normal polling operations done by DER Plant Controller. Total 
number of Modbus packets sent during the operational time of 40 seconds were 37392, out of 
which 18557 (49.62%) were sent during the flooding attack. It was observed and can be seen in 
Figure 11(a) that the number of packets significantly reduced as during no flooding which 
encompasses 14 seconds of operational time. 18835 (50.37%) packets were sent out making the 
maximum RTT for the Modbus query and response to reach 5 ms for a read request of the holding 
registers. Figure 11(b) shows the network traffic when the TCP SYN flood attack was carried from 
the KALI machine connected to the WAN interface on port 6002, 445, 139 and 135 for about 26 
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seconds. We see a drastic change in maximum RTT for the Modbus queries and response making 
it 2.5 seconds for read request of the holding registers. 
 
 
Figure 10.(a) Network behavior under TCP SYN Flood attack on One Port 
 
 
 
Figure 10.(b) Network behavior under TCP SYN Flood attack on Four Ports 
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We can infer from the above results that if the DER-Plant controller is attacked from more 
than one attacker at a time, the time delay between query and response will increase.  In our case, 
the delay jumped from 5 ms to 2.5 seconds for unit 16 register when one port was flooded and four 
ports were flooded respectively. As the number of attacked ports increase, the delay will also 
significantly increase, which may hamper the DER uint 16 register functions like AC current, 
Phase A AC current, AC current scale factor for current and AC voltage scale factor and AC 
frequency are some of the functions that are based on uint 16 Modbus registers.  
5.4 Security Evaluation of IDS 
The rule-based intrusion detection system developed for the Modbus protocol performance 
was tested during the course of this research work. The rules detected the signature-based alerts 
with 100% accuracy. A showcase of the rules is shown below: 
Figure 11. Capture of Detected Snort Rules 
  
To check the latency performance of the intrusion detection system in the network, we 
injected payloads of various attacks. The time to sniff the injected packet by the IDS sensor is 
found by finding the difference between the sum of the time at which the attack was injected, one 
way trip time for the packet from the attacker machine to the PV inverter and the time at which 
the sensor picked up the packet traffic. 
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Figure 12. Sniffing time for sensor in the network 
 Looking at the graph, we see that the network latency experienced by the sensor to pick up 
various attack traffic ranges from 277 ms to 500 ms which is pretty decent in a network with heavy 
traffic. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
The tasks in the research work were successfully carried out which include: 
● Design of conceptual IDS integrated DER architecture 
● Design Modbus attack scripts 
● Modbus protocol signature based rules for functions and measurement 
● Network latency performance test 
● Security evaluation of IDS 
Achieving the detection for unencrypted traffic is just the halfway towards reaching the goal 
of a fully functional DER infrastructure. Further (i) end-to-end IDS design and evaluation with 
Modus at the plant level and DNP 3 in WAN level (ii) integration of end-to-end encryption and 
implementing proxy server in line to the IDS sensor for decryption in order to let the sensor detect 
anomalous traffic through signature-based rule detection. 
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